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ABSTRACT 
Choosing “Home”: Refugee Rights to Resettlement and Secondary Migration in the 
United States 
Victoria Macchi 
The United States is on the cusp of one of the largest increases in refugee admissions in more 
than a decade. Ahead of this surge in arrivals, this paper provides a new analysis of current 
placement procedures and government data through the human rights lens, focusing on 
secondary migration and integration, and assesses unaddressed, long-standing deficiencies in the 
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. It also offers recommendations for systemic changes at the 
local, national and international levels to incorporate increased personal agency in the 
resettlement process and improve outcomes in the U.S. for newly arriving refugee cohorts.
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Introduction 
In the coming year, the United States will witness the largest increase in refugee arrivals since 
2004, and with it thousands of Syrians fleeing both civil war and the Islamic State.1 The Obama 
administration directive, announced by the Secretary of State John Kerry on Sept. 20, 2015, will 
significantly increase the target of refugee admittances2 and the country is on course to reach the 
85,000 refugee ceiling by Sept. 30, 2016. The policy decision followed a summer of frequently 
deadly travel for refugees and economic migrants from the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa, 
toward Europe, and an exodus from Islamic State-threatened areas in Syria and Iraq to 
neighboring Jordan and Turkey.3 But a series of coordinated, deadly attacks across Paris on 
November 13, 2015, and the erroneous attribution of responsibility to Syrian refugees in early 
media reports, triggered political backlash toward refugee resettlement throughout Europe and in 
the world’s largest third-country recipient of refugees - the United States. Several state 
legislatures introduced and passed bills to thwart resettlement in their state (Rathod 2016); 31 
governors voiced opposition (Seipel 2015); and the issue became even more politicized as 
Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump called for a ban on Muslim immigrants and 
Syrian refugees, citing safety concerns and allegations of terrorist connections among those 
fleeing violence (Diamond 2015). In this climate of political divisiveness on refugee resettlement 
comes the biggest back-to-back growth in nearly a decade for projected refugee arrivals in the 
                                                 
1 From 2003 to 2004, refugee admittances jumped from 28,403 to 52,873, a net gain of 24,470 year over year, based 
on data from U.S. State Department’s Refugee Processing Center. 
2 70,000 in FY2015; 85,000 in FY2016; 110,000 in FY2017. 
3 While in recent years the United States received only dozens of refugees annually, the country received more than 
10,000 Syrians in FY2016, marking a significant uptick for arrivals. 
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coming two fiscal years. It is in this context that this paper will scrutinize the efforts of the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program. 
The new refugee admittance figures are a sizeable increase - the 100,0000 threshold hasn’t been 
crossed since the early 1990s.4 It is not an unprecedented number for the U.S.; the country 
regularly demonstrated in the 1970s and 1980s its capacity to absorb hundreds of thousands of 
people fleeing violence, war, and persecution. But the program’s success in accepting 3.2 million 
refugees since 1975 hinges not just on political realities but administrative constraints and 
oversights. As recently as last year, bills introduced in Congress demanded improved 
accountability mechanisms, more nuanced reports, and more efficient procedures to handle a 
population that is increasingly diverse and more dispersed throughout the U.S. 
Current U.S. resettlement policy - and that of other third-country refugee recipients - is the result 
of decades of standard operating procedures; it favors widespread dispersion, pushing refugees to 
cities and states regardless of their personal preference from coast to coast, in almost every U.S. 
state. This extends from an international practice that voids personal agency in country selection, 
creating a double-denial of choice in refugees deciding for their future. While several academic 
works have explored through qualitative analysis the placement and internal migration 
experiences of specific ethnic groups in their resettlement country, this paper will reach across 
the boundaries of countries of origin to create a new analysis at the national level that the current 
government-directed resettlement policy and the practice of restricted placement choice and 
geographic dispersion hinder refugee incorporation and well-being in the U.S. and supplant 
                                                 
4 From 2007-2009 (54% from 48,282 to 74,311); these projected ceilings for refugee admittances will be a 57% 
increase from 2015-2017.  
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personal agency; it will ultimately argue for a revised system that upholds the right to freedom of 
movement and supports individual or communal decision-making throughout the resettlement 
process.  
After a brief background on refugee resettlement and decision-making in Chapter 1, this this 
paper will argue that the current deficiency in understanding post-resettlement refugee 
movement in the U.S. creates unintentional but very real barriers to refugee integration and 
community acceptance, consequently limiting public services, misdirecting funds, and denying 
refugees and the receiving communities access to information and services fundamental to 
improving integration outcomes and community support. Chapter 2 discusses the disadvantages 
created by the current placement system and the importance of resettlement location; Chapter 3 
introduces secondary migration as a potential indicator for problematic resettlement placement 
locations; Chapter 4 argues for adapting the resettlement system toward a more holistic, long-
term approach that upholds the right to freedom of movement and reframes secondary migration. 
Chapter 1: The U.S. Refugee Program and Decision-Making in the Placement System 
The United Nations estimated there were 16.1 million refugees under UNHCR mandate in 20155; 
this means on any given day there are millions of people living outside their home country due to 
a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion” who are unable or unwilling to return to it. After 
leaving their country of origin, refugees must first seek asylum in the country to which they have 
                                                 
5 An additional 5.2 Palestinian refugees were under the UNRWA mandate in FY2015. 
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travelled, or receive refugee status, usually granted through a registration process with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Of the millions of refugees officially identified around the world, only a fraction will be chosen 
for relocation to a third country; it is referred to regularly as the option of last resort, when 
refugees cannot return home or settle permanently in the country of asylum, and it is driven by a 
reciprocal vetting process lead by UNHCR in which the international organization recommended 
an individual or family for resettlement to a receiving state, the state scrutinizes and adjudicates 
the case, and if affirmative, the individual or family accepts or declines the relocation.  
UNHCR only refers about 1% of refugees for third-country resettlement. But approval for third-
country relocation does not guarantee resettlement; the vetting process can take years, as is the 
case with U.S. screening. In 2015, UNHCR submitted 134,000 refugees to countries for 
resettlement, of which 107,100 were admitted across 27 countries.6 Of those, the U.S. 
traditionally accepts the highest number of refugees; last year was no exception, with 69,933 
people admitted as refugees, according to U.S. State Department data (UNHCR 2016).  
The United States has accepted millions of refugees under various laws going back to the 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 after World War II. For decades, the focus of the refugee 
program in the U.S. was crisis mitigation with a specific regional focus, notably European Jews 
at the end of World War II and Southeast Asians in the mid to late 1970s. The scope of this paper 
will be limited to the current U.S. refugee law, which began under President Jimmy Carter with 
the Refugee Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-212), introduced in the Senate as S. 643 by Sen. 
                                                 
6 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
U.S. have resettlement programs, though other countries may take in refugees on an ad hoc basis. 
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Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA). It amended the earlier Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 
and set a cap of 50,000 refugees annually unless otherwise mandated by the president, who can 
change it for up to 12 months. The Refugee Act of 1980 codified the definition of a refugee into 
U.S. law by drawing largely on the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the 
U.S. acceded in 1968. From 1975 - the start of the Southeast Asian refugee wave, until end-2015, 
the State Department counts 3.25 million refugees from an increasingly diverse range of 
countries.  
Figure 1. Refugee Arrivals to the U.S. by Region of Origin, 1975 – 2015. 
(Source: U.S. State Department) 
 
The only refugees eligible for U.S. resettlement are those referred by UNHCR or a U.S. embassy 
in the country of asylum. Eligibility is determined in part by a security check; after approval, a 
refugee must undergo a medical exam and cultural orientation; Before traveling to the U.S., a 
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refugee - usually entire immediate families – can spend anywhere from two months to two years 
in the bureaucratic decision-making and vetting process. IOM then coordinates international 
travel, and the U.S. provides an interest-free loan for travel. Upon arrival, refugees are placed in 
a location where resettlement services are available. They are immediately eligible for medical 
and cash assistance. U.S. government agencies in coordination with UN entities carry out the 
following system for refugee third-country assignment: 
Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration suggests 
admissions ceilings and processing priorities to the President. 
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees refers cases from the country 
of first asylum to the U.S. for resettlement. 
 
A refugee case file is created. Overseas Resettlement Support Centers 
interview refugee applicants to obtain biographical information, why they left 
their home country, and information regarding their persecution 
 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services reviews the case file, interviews 
the applicants in person, and adjudicates the applications. 
 
Multiple U.S. government agencies conduct security checks. 
 
Overseas Resettlement Support Centers arrange medical examinations of 
refugees before travel with physicians approved by the International 
Organization for Migration and U.S. Embassy. 
 
Refugees are assigned to one of the nine centralized national voluntary 
resettlement agencies; they also receive cultural orientation classes. 
 
International Organization for Migration coordinates refugee travel; the U.S. 
government arranges a no-interest loan for refugees to repay travel costs. 
 
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection screens arriving refugees upon 
arrival. 
 
Office of Refugee Resettlement administers domestic resettlement benefits. 
 
National voluntary resettlement agencies provide resettlement assistance and 
services. and determine initial placement along with government counterparts. 
Figure 2. The Refugee Resettlement Process 
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U.S. Obligations and Objectives in Resettlement 
The U.S. admits refugees in three groups: “Priority One” is the most well-known - individuals 
seeking safety from persecution for whom there is no other durable solution. “Priority Two” are 
the groups of “special concern” to the United States, as determined by Department of State in 
coordination with UNHCR, other federal agencies, and NGOs. Examples are certain persons 
from Cuba, Burma, and Iraq. “Priority Three” is for family reunification -- the immediate 
relatives of refugees who are already settled in the United States.  
The first lines of the U.S. law regarding resettlement outline the program’s main objectives for 
refugees as “economic self-sufficiency… as quickly as possible” as well as employment training 
and job placement; English language acquisition follows, as well as regulations on financial 
assistance. Refugees are almost exclusively discussed in their capacity as part of the U.S. 
economy and in the context of avoiding long-term public assistance. Success is measured in 
annual reports to Congress by how quickly an adult refugee is employed and able to disengage 
from federal subsidies during the first eight months in the U.S. (Annual Reports to 
Congress n.d.). Legally under Article 34 of the Refugee Convention, states parties including the 
U.S. have an obligation to “as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of 
refugees; the country also has a self-imposed commitment to leadership in refugee resettlement.7 
However, while the U.S. provides a path to citizenship for refugees after five years in the 
country, there is no explicit commitment to integration or social support in the aforementioned 
law, though in reality the public-private partnership that the resettlement program has become 
                                                 
7 The U.S. refugee resettlement program “reflects the United States’ highest values and aspirations to compassion, 
generosity and leadership,” according to the State Department. (Refugee Admissions n.d.)  
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does account for such issues through social events, mentorship programs, mental health services, 
and English-language training.  
Once refugees are in the U.S., public law mandates federal assistance in their resettlement. 
(Article 23 of the Refugee Convention and Protocol requires that states parties “shall accord to 
refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and 
assistance as is accorded to their nationals.”) Refugees receive aid from VOLAGs to find 
housing, work, and language training; they are expected to find work within six months of 
arrival, and can apply for U.S. permanent residency after 1 year; and citizenship after 5 years 
(U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants n.d.). All refugees arriving in the United States 
receive a one-time stipend and are eligible for some federal benefits.  
The VOLAGs are the contracting partner in executing the resettlement program. The Office of 
Refugee Resettlement works with nine national organizations - seven of which are religiously 
affiliated - which in turn coordinate with 350 local affiliate sites in every state but Wyoming. All 
together, the nine domestic resettlement agencies place refugees in hundreds of communities 
throughout the United States.  
Decision-making and Dispersion in the Resettlement Process 
Refugee resettlement is not a right, and refugees “do not choose to be resettled or decide which 
country will accept them,” UNHCR explains in a brochure (United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees). Although as in a report commissioned by the U.S. government, David A. Martin 
highlights that refugees may exhibit some agency in choosing to leave their country of origin, 
that choice all but ends once they have legally been acknowledged as refugees 
(Martin 2005, p. 3). Once inside the international refugee system, as operated by the United 
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Nations and its constituent agencies, refugees do not choose the location of their third country 
resettlement. Unless family ties to a country are established, the international refugee process 
limits refugees from exerting geographic choice. Refugees can decline a country’s offer for 
resettlement, with the caveat that that “could jeopardize future resettlement.” (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees). This is the starting point for a system that to a certain extent 
decides refugees’ futures for them - the options of remaining in a refugee camp or moving to that 
country are the choices presented.  
Meanwhile, as refugees are in the final stages of processing abroad, in the U.S. the VOLAGs 
determine if, where and when it can accept the new arrivals and provide assurance as such to the 
Department of State. Housing, employment, needed services, readiness of the host community 
are principal determinants of placement location. ORR says refugees are placed in proportion to 
a state’s population. A weekly meeting between the public and private sector stakeholders in 
Arlington, Virginia, assesses “country of origin, family size, names and ages, religious 
preference, medical needs,” and “other” factors like family or other connections in the U.S. 
(Martin 2005, p. 76). 
U.S. law codifies geographic dispersion as a resettlement policy, a practice that has been in place 
since the 1980s. By statute, and barring “unusual” but unspecified circumstances, the director of 
the Office of Refugee Resettlement is bound by the Authorization for Programs for Domestic 
Resettlement of and Assistance to Refugees to:  
 Avoid placing refugees in areas that are already “highly impacted” by refugees or 
comparable populations unless the placement is for reunification of immediate family  
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 Provide a mechanism for local VOLAG affiliates to meet at least quarterly with state and 
local government officials in advance of refugee arrivals for placement coordination. And 
in that meeting, take into account:  
o the proportion of refugees and comparable entrants already in the area’s 
population;  
o the availability of jobs, affordable housing, and other resources (like schools, 
health care, and mental health services) for refugees; 
o The likelihood of refugees placed there becoming self-sufficient and free from 
long-term dependence on public assistance; 
o And finally, consideration of the “secondary migration of refugees to and from 
the area that is likely to occur.” 
Initial settlement reflects the VOLAG system, rather than personal choice,” observes Mott 
(Forrest and Brown 2014); consequently, refugees frequently must follow the established, well-
worn patterns provided by the system, rather than determine their own path. International 
agencies and the U.S. say they attempt to keep families together by matching them up 
geographically; the extent to which that is successful is not made public. When refugees do not 
have or do not identify those relationships to refugee officials (“geo cases”), they are determined 
to be “free cases.” Otherwise the free cases are allocated so that each VOLAG will meet its 
allocation for the year. Refugees who have no family in the U.S. are “sponsored” by the 
resettlement agency, which decides on the best match between a community’s resources and the 
refugee’s needs. As Anne C. Richard, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration, explained: “We resettle refugees all across the U.S., and we don’t pick 
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a city to be the new capital of – Little Damascus or something. Instead, we believe most parts of 
the United States can be a – offer a home to refugees (Richard 2015). 
But what of the sense of community sought out by some groups? The Kurds have congregated in 
Nashville, transforming an area at the southern end of the city in Little Kurdistan. Could it work 
better, then, to place refugees at least where they know the environment, or feel more at ease in a 
community with a shared culture? Several Kurdish refugees have commented, in reporting for 
Voice of America, that their families were resettled in Fargo, North Dakota, and Phoenix, 
Arizona, but ultimately saved enough money to move to Nashville – the geographic hub of 
Kurdish resettlement – in part because there was a Kurdish community, but also because the 
rolling green hills reminded them of Iraqi Kurdistan, and fertile soil could grow the figs and 
pomegranates of their former lives. “We didn't choose to leave our home (in Iraqi Kurdistan). We were 
sort of driven out. But we really did choose to come to Tennessee,” says Kasar Abdulla, the youngest of 
nine children. “It’s an agriculture state,” she explained. “It reminds us of home.” The early years 
for her family, like for many refugee Kurds resettled in the U.S., were about surviving, when all 
you could bring from your old life needed to fit into a single suitcase. Finding work. Getting the 
kids into school. Learning English. Repaying the plane tickets from refugee camps. Then saving 
money for months or years to move the family to Nashville, where a growing Kurdish 
community was deepening its roots. “We Kurds live as a tribe,” explains Salah Osman, the imam 
at the local Kurdish mosque. “We have that strong relationship... it's magnetic.” (Macchi 2016, 
forthcoming). That magnetism ultimately led to a confluence of Kurdish refugee families in the 
Tennessee capital.  
Similarly, Win La Bar, a teenager whose Burmese Karenni family followed other relatives and 
resettled in Phoenix, Arizona, from a Thai refugee camp, reported that having other Burmese 
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community members nearby helps his mother, who doesn’t speak English, is illiterate in her 
native language, and doesn’t always have her children nearby to translate or interpret for her 
(Macchi 2016) 
Chapter 2 will explore the importance of placement for both the receiving community and the 
refugees in the resettlement process, and the challenges failed placement can create.  
Chapter 2: Why Placement Matters: Challenges under the Current System 
As established in Chapter 1, refugees get placed initially in U.S. cities where they might not want 
to be, perhaps isolated from extended family or close friends, in an unfamiliar climate. Refugees 
have little to no choice in the geographic placement. In a study of African refugees in the U.S., 
Tamar Mott determined that “most participants… reported only being happy to be finally 
arriving in the U.S.” (Mott 2009). This aligns with Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, who 
assert that first-generation immigrants often have a “dual frame of reference” that juxtaposes 
their previous life before migration and their current life, leading immigrants to feel that life in 
the United States is markedly better than the life they left behind (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-
Orozco 1995). 
But Mott, and other researchers, have also determined at the ethno-national level for a cohort, 
placement matters. As established by Brown and Mott, refugees will either follow their 
predecessors (as post-World War II Jewish refugees followed the migration patterns of other 
European immigrants to the U.S.) or, if among an early cohort, they will set the trend for ensuing 
arrivals. In 1984, a doctoral candidate in Michigan studied the previous decade of Vietnamese 
refugee arrivals, commented of the model of four temporary refugee camps, followed by 
sponsorship and placement by VOLAGs: “the initial policy of dispersing the Vietnamese, a 
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subsequent secondary migration and clustering has played an important role in determining the 
location of these later arrivers” (Case 1984). Years later, Brown and Mott would similarly note 
of refugee chain migration that “although refugees constitute only a portion of total 
immigration… their effects are disproportionately large in terms of changing the foreign born 
profiles of (Metropolitan Statistical Areas) and other communities, changing the fabric of 
society, and changing the geography of the foreign-born in all its ramifications” (Brown, Mott 
and Malecki 2007).  
David W. Haines, who studied the earliest refugee cohorts through the 1980s and 1990s, also 
noted that “the specific localities in which refugees settle - only partially as a matter of choice - 
also affect their incorporation in terms of available housing stock, specific jobs, educational 
resources, and general community public opinion about them” (Haines 1997). For this reason, 
Case argued for premeditated placement based on refugee preference; he notes in his study of 
Vietnamese refugees in Michigan that “if there is a strong motivation to live with family and 
near friends and countrymen during an adjustment period, then care should be given to locate 
refugees in clusters and not to isolate them. If the primary motivation is to migrate where the 
jobs are located, then refugees should be placed in areas with ample job opportunities” 
(Case 1984).  
In reports beginning in the 1980s, ethnographers and sociologists have documented several 
refugee cohorts in the U.S., largely concentrated on the Southeast Asia and African groups. Their 
findings generally do not focus on the placement process, but observations scattered throughout 
begin to provide a clearer picture of the challenges in a placement system driven by dispersion 
and authority-led decision-making. The placement system at the international and national levels 
generally denies personal agency, and also creates a subset of problems. Poor initial placement 
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has, in worst-case scenarios, led to homeless refugees, as Mott documented, strained local 
refugee and welfare services and inhibited integration efforts. Of inexhaustive but exemplary 
note are the following: 
Mental health, social life, and well-being 
 In Mott’s survey of African refugees in the U.S., participants suggested “good” 
resettlement locations; she notes that refugees placed in large cities (e.g., Atlanta, 
Chicago, New York and Washington, D.C.) “were unhappy with their first places of 
resettlement, and ended up relocation as a result. Subsequently, they noted that 
refugees should not be resettled in large cities because they are unaffordable, 
dangerous, and are not good environments to raise a family” (Mott 2009).  
 “By relocating refugees to unfamiliar communities, the resettlement agencies may 
restrict their cultural and social opportunities as well as any ties to the refugees’ past 
identities” (Lunn 2011, p. 834).  
 As Hein notes, “prejudice and discrimination are also more serious problems for the 
refugees when they live in small cities rather than in big ones” (Hein 2006, p. 169). In 
smaller Eau Claire, the Hmong listed discrimination as their top concern, whereas in 
Milwaukee, it was third.  
 The consequences that secondary migrants reported included social isolation, stress, 
and mental and physical health problems. One single mother from Sarajevo destined 
to Newfoundland despite her expressed preference to join a friend in British 
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Columbia resorted to taking sedatives in order to cope with depression (Simich, 
Beiser and Mawani 2003). 
Economic health 
 In a survey of recent refugee arrivals for the “Hmong Resettlement Study” of 1984, 
the authors similarly identified the importance of geographic placement, noting that 
“There are a number of barriers that were consistently identified as impediments to 
effective resettlement, particularly with regard to attainment of economic self-
sufficiency. Among the most commonly mentioned factors were… resettlement 
policies which often placed important relatives far away from one another or in poor 
economic environments, paving the way for later secondary migration” (Downing, 
et al. 1984).  
 Again in Mott’s survey of African refugees, she notes that “many participants, 
particularly those in Columbus, maintained that their initial placements were ‘not 
good.’ Some, in desperate situations, chose to move to Columbus as a result, Upon 
arriving in Columbus, many realized they were homeless, without the resources of 
their initial placement, and additionally strained an overwhelmed shelter system. “The 
situation makes one wonder, if the initial placements by the government had been 
more appropriate, would social service agencies in Columbus be in the position that 
they are now?” (Mott 2009, p. 219) 
Refugees have the right to move as soon as they land in the U.S. - and they do move, in what is 
termed “secondary migration” (See Ch. 3). The issues of primary placement and secondary 
migration raise questions about the intersection of human rights - namely the right to freedom of 
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movement - and the refugee resettlement process. U.S. law does acknowledge explicitly that 
refugees, once in the U.S., are free to move at their will8 as enshrined in international treaties and 
conventions; but it is not upheld as a right to which the country is duty-bound.  
 
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
state.” 
 
Article 26 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
“Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose 
their place of residence to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable 
to aliens generally in the same circumstances.” 
 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence… The above-mentioned rights shall 
not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to 
protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and 
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.” 
 
Figure 3. Freedom of Movement as a Right 
Additionally, Simich, Beiser and Mawani posit in their 2003 study on resettlement in Canada, 
excluding refugee decision-making in the placement process can hinder acceptance for both the 
receiving community, and the refugees: 
Balancing human rights against the need to manage refugee mobility is not only a Canadian, but 
also an international concern. Refugees do not always move according to bureaucratic plan. 
Exercising what choice they can, many move according to an alternate plan in apparent self-
interest. The settlement path is consequently altered and may be disrupted at significant cost to 
the refugee and to the host government. In this case, the tension between the basic human right to 
                                                 
8 Among other rights, like the right to work and to access education and public assistance.  
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move at will - embodied in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - collides with the need 
to plan and provide well-organized resettlement supports (Simich, Beiser and Mawani 2003). 
A report by Simich found that of 47 secondary refugee migrants in Canada interviewed for the 
study, “30 had expressed a preferred destination because of the presence of friends or family but 
were destined elsewhere.” A minority - seven - had no preference because they had no contacts 
in Canada. Newbold, relying on Simich’s earlier work, observed that refugees with ties to a 
destination will head to where “social support and interaction with members of their community, 
and particularly family, are greater, reinforcing Simich's comments that refugees who are not 
located near family and friends are at high risk for relocation” (Newbold 2007). But if any 
weight is placed on refugee choice, it is not noted in USRAP reports or procedures; there is no 
public data from USRAP on any expressed location preference, frequency and timing of refugee 
relocation, but it does indicate that thousands of refugees are on the move within the first years 
of arriving to the U.S. Inappropriate placements can have significant consequences on 
communities, funding, mental health, security and finances, and can lead refugees to move 
elsewhere. Although Mott,9 Simich, Beiser, and Mawani, resettlement officials and members of 
Congress highlight the burden of secondary migration, that choice to move isn’t inherently bad - 
it is, however, complicated, and can be financially straining for the native-born - much less for 
cash-strapped recent refugee arrivals, many of whom have been out of the formal labor market 
and education system for years. As Chapter 3 will elaborate, refugee dissatisfaction with 
placement location can lead to secondary migration.  
                                                 
9 “When initial placements are not good ones for refugees, and they are not receiving sufficient support’ some, in 
desperate situations, choose to move elsewhere,” echoes Mott. “This places a strain on communities that are not 
anticipating their arrival.” (Mott 2009) 
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Chapter 3: Secondary Migration and Freedom of Movement 
“It's kind of a ghost population, because you don't really know how many people you're talking 
about at any point in time.”10 
-Lewis Kimsey, Kansas State Refugee Coordinator 
Every year, tens of thousands of new refugees arrive to the U.S. And from the moment they step 
foot in the U.S. - though still years away from becoming citizens - they are free to move 
wherever they want. In the last three fiscal years for which ORR provided data for this report, the 
number of refugees moving within three years of their arrival has been 10,000-11,000 annually, 
or about 15% of the arrivals in a given year. The UN calls it “secondary migration,” and defines 
it as “the voluntary movement of migrants or refugees within their receiving country away from 
the community in which they originally resided.”11 U.S. government reports and VOLAGs use 
the same terminology (though it can also be used in other contexts to describe migration between 
countries). 
While U.S. refugees can, in theory, pick up and move as soon as they land in the U.S., no 
government or VOLAG office promotes that as an option, given the bureaucratic paperwork 
needed to obtain Social Security documentation, enroll children in school, access healthcare, and 
receive financial support in the immediate days and months following arrival to the U.S. 
Refugees are incentivized to stay in the primary resettlement city, at least for 90 days, in part by 
                                                 
10 (Secondary Migration of Refugees: Collaborating to Ensure Community Integration, 2014) 
11 (The International Thesaurus of Refugee Terminology) 
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linking their resettlement stipend to their arrival at the primary placement location, and also by 
creating a system in which resettlement officials are the cultural guides and interpreters. 
But in all of the choices leading up to boarding a commercial jet bound for one of the seven U.S. 
ports of entry, refugees have never been asked - do they want to live near more of their ethnic 
community members? Do they want to live in a place where they can use the skills they have 
already? They are required to pay for their plane tickets to the U.S., but have no agency as to 
where they end up. The financial burden of relocation is clear - between transportation and 
housing costs, even a small family is looking at potentially thousands of dollars to move between 
states. 
While in the 1970s, Southeast Asians were first triaged through refugee camps at U.S. military 
bases, where they spent months, refugees are now generally greeted at the airport by VOLAG 
staff and escorted to a temporary apartment; from there they begin a cycle of job searching, 
English classes, and school for the children. In some cases, there are medical resources 
designated for refugees in need. But there is no claim to public health or security that restricts 
refugees’ movement, which the ICCPR outlines as potential grounds for limitations on refugee 
movement. This has leading to notable cases of secondary migration, which the U.S. government 
delineates as a departure from the city of placement within three years of arrival in the U.S. In 
some reported cases, refugees have moved more than once.  
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Vietnamese Shrimpers in Florida 
In an interview for Voice of America in 2015, Dung Nguyen explained how his family – 
generations of fisherman from Vietnam – was placed in a camp for refugee arrivals at a north 
Florida U.S. Air Force base; upon leaving the camp, the family found work in Florida in the 
shrimping industry, because it was what they knew how to do; they stayed, and Dung 
continues to captain a shrimping boat much of the year. One of his crewman, however, was 
settled in Arkansas. His family moved themselves to the southeast because they heard there 
was work on the water, and other Vietnamese families. They carved out a space for themselves 
doing what they knew how to do, and now the first U.S.-born generation - like Dung’s two 
sons - is opting out of the seafaring life and into professional fields, like engineering and 
pharmacy. They weren’t sent to Florida because it was a good match, but the families knew 
they had a better chance of success where they already knew the skills (Macchi 2015). 
Figure 4. Choosing Florida as “Home” – A Shrimper’s Story 
Early cases of secondary migration were dramatic. A 1983 newspaper report cites an ORR 
official that up to 28% of the 640,000 Indochinese refugees in the country participated in 
secondary migration (Moritz 1983); government numbers from ORR Annual Reports for 
FY1980-FY1984 reflect substantial movement as well, in particular toward California. The 
results, according to local officials in the story, were “overcrowded schools, competition for 
scarce jobs, and a refugee welfare burden that increasingly falls on local, not federal, 
authorities.” Later in this chapter, we will review two official attempts to stanch the out-
migration. But first, as Simich, Beiser and Mawani ask in a 2003 analysis of refugee well-being 
during early resettlement in Canada, “Why would refugees, who are by definition violently 
uprooted and in need of stability and support, choose to uproot themselves again?” 
Why Refugees Move 
As discussed in Ch. 2, refugees move for jobs or family or friends; for climate or better schools; 
they change neighborhoods, cities and states for what they perceive will be improve conditions 
(Office of Refugee Resettlement 1982, p. 16); (Haines 1997). Sometimes it works, like the risk 
of relocating to Lewiston, Maine, that has seemingly paid off for thousands of Somalis unhappy 
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with their initial resettlement locations (though only after years of icy reception from the mayor) 
(Huisman, Hough, et al. 2011). Sometimes it fails, like in the case of secondary refugee migrants 
to Columbus who, without access to the services from their primary resettlement location, ended 
up homeless and in overburdened shelters (Mott 2009). A 1982 ORR report to Congress 
elaborated reasons for movement by Southeast Asian refugees: “employment opportunities, 
reunification with relatives, the attraction of an ethnic community, and favorable climate” 
(Office of Refugee Resettlement 1982).  
In the U.S., the most thorough academic literature has largely concentrated on two groups of 
refugees: Southeast Asians who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s, and Africans who arrived in the 
1990s and 2000s. The studies are generally small but revelatory; for example, systemic efforts to 
disperse Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s “did not allow for therapeutic clustering, and many 
refugees were isolated, and nearly cut off from their traditional support systems. The only 
alternative for many refugees was to migrate to places where other family members resided or 
where large clusters of other Vietnamese lived” (Case 1984). The effect of this top-down 
decision-making is repeatedly noted in studies about the community; “Vietnamese refugees have 
resettled in every state and many territories of the United States. Despite the initial government 
attempt to disperse them throughout the country, secondary migration has led to heavy 
concentration of refugees in a few states,” Haines observed. 
Additionally, of the 22 African refugee families surveyed for a 2011 report on intra and interstate 
migration, 20 reported the need for larger or cheaper housing as motivation for moving; seven 
moved for work reasons; a majority - 68% - cited reunification with family or community as 
motivation to move; neighborhood safety, school quality, and climate were also given as reasons 
for changing locations (Weine, et al., 2011, p. 27). In her study of Somali refugees and secondary 
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migration to Maine, Kimberly A. Huisman posits that quality of life choices (safety, education, 
housing, public assistance) and shared cultural and religious community in a small town attracted 
Somali refugees; she observes that job scarcity in the former mill town, however, is also pushing 
the same refugees away from their second U.S. home. “Having fled the violence of war and the 
instability of refugee camps, many Somalis were not willing to accept their placement in crime 
and drug-ridden neighborhoods in the US,” she notes. But “after the basic needs of safety and 
security are met, there is more space for their agentic orientation to shift toward the future” 
(Huisman 2011). The Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and Migration at the U.S. 
State Department, Anne C. Richard, attributes some movement to word of mouth for job offers, 
which has been documented by official government and academic reports but is not the only, or 
even the strongest, motivator. “You will see this sort of secondary migration, which is normal 
and – but it’s not by design,” she explained, in a statement representative of the government 
rhetoric around secondary migration: we don’t want it, but we can’t stop it. “Once (refugees) 
come to the United States, they’re free to move. They have to stay – if they want the three 
months of assistance we provide to them for reception and placement in the U.S., they have to 
stay in one place. But after that, they’re just like Americans; they can go anywhere” (Richard 
2015). 
To wit, the Hmong Resettlement Study, researchers found the group used secondary migration 
for three reasons:  
(1) solving specific problems, such as family reunification, access to more favorable 
economic environments, or the resolution of factional strife between different groups of 
Hmong; 
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(2) providing a means to explore new settings and ways of living in the United States, 
e.g., developing family farms, trying rural rather than urban settings, or living in large 
enclaves rather than smaller, more isolated resettlement communities; and  
(3) maintaining hope for the future through the psychological renewal experienced 
through experimentation and movement. (Downing , Olney, Mason, & Hendricks 1984) 
There are positive and negative inputs for and outcomes from secondary migration. The question 
is whether the scales ultimately lean more heavily toward one side. Simich, Beiser and Mawani 
noted this duality: “Secondary migration can be costly and disruptive both to the immigration 
and settlement infrastructure and to the refugees themselves… (S)earching for necessary social 
support—especially to be near family or friends—is the main reason that secondary migrants 
make the decision to depart from the official plans made for them.” 
“We should not underestimate,” they wrote, “the significance of affirmational support and 
experience shared by family (immediate and extended) and friends” (Simich, Beiser and Mawani 
2003).  
Federal Oversight and the Lugar Report 
For as long as the Refugee Act of 1980 has been in place, government officials have issued 
annual reports to Congress, including a section on secondary migration. Early narratives about 
secondary migration were much more detailed and nuanced than more recent reports, which 
discuss secondary migration in three short, boilerplate paragraphs. The first report in 1981 for 
FY1980 documented secondary migration for only the Southeast Asian refugees - at the time, the 
largest group. California, Washington, Virginia, Texas, and Massachusetts ranked highest in net 
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inflow - not the total movement of individuals as later ORR reports would document. The same 
report observed that the "apparent large migration out of the District of Columbia deserves 
comment," and is likely the result of refugees finding more suitable housing in adjacent Virginia 
and Maryland. This era was also when the Hmong migrated to secondary cities to be part of 
larger communities in California, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Jeremy Hein notes in his study of 
refugee populations in four northern U.S. cities that about 40% of the Hmong population in 
Milwaukee arrived directly from Southeast Asia; 60% moved there from their original 
resettlement locations, giving the Wisconsin city “the distinction of being one of the few big 
cities where the Hmong chose to live” (Hein 2006).  
There has seemingly been little public discussion by the agencies involved – private and public - 
to identify, acknowledge or address when the assigned location was ineffective, triggering 
secondary migration. This secondary migration has been noted in government reports dating 
back to the early 1980s, but is seldom the focus of published reports. In fact, in its annual report 
to Congress, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) devotes only three boilerplate 
paragraphs – repeated almost in their entirety from year to year – to secondary migration, yet 
allocated millions of dollars to support VOLAGs struggling with refugees who moved to an area 
outside their original resettlement location. An Iraqi Kurd may be resettled in North Dakota, a 
Somali in Atlanta, a Burmese Karenni in Arizona. 
In order to “better understand the challenges confronting resettlement cities and the refugees 
admitted to the United States,” Senator Richard Lugar, ranking member of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, asked staff to assess the government’s policies and programs for refugee 
admissions and resettlement. The 2010 report, “Abandonment Upon Arrival,” determined that 
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resettlement efforts in many U.S. cities were underfunded and overburdening, which meant they 
also weren’t meeting basic needs of refugees. 
The issue of monitoring when and where refugees move after they are initially resettled in the 
United States, known as secondary migration, also presents a critical challenge to the backward-
looking funding system. Secondary migration within the first 8 months of resettlement can create 
hidden populations of unsupported refugees. There is currently no system in place to transfer 
refugee entitlement benefits (e.g., medical insurance, housing support, welfare support) from 
state to state, placing a further unexpected strain on communities” (United States Senate 2010).  
The report highlights how Fort Wayne, Indiana - Lugar’s home state - became a “community of 
choice” for Burmese refugees resettled elsewhere in the U.S. City leaders estimated at the time 
that two secondary migrants were arriving for each refugee directly resettled in the city. The 
resources required to assist this flow of secondary migrants were not being directed to Fort 
Wayne. “The concern surrounding secondary migration is warranted because some refugee 
populations have proven to pose special resettlement challenges,” according to the Lugar report. 
“Many of the more than 6,000 Burmese refugees in Fort Wayne are illiterate in their native 
language, have few marketable skills, and are accustomed to government dependence after being 
confined to refugee camps for a decade or more. The demand that they become conversant, 
employed, and self-sufficient within PRM’s 90-day time limit was deemed ‘cruel and unethical’ 
by Dr. Jeanne Zehr, assistant superintendent of East Allen Community Schools.” Lewiston, 
Maine, underwent a similar phenomenon with Somali refugees who, determining their original 
placements in major metropolitan areas - which they deemed lacking in adequate schools and job 
opportunities, headed north from cities like Atlanta to one of the whitest, coldest states in the 
lower 48 (Huisman, Hough, et al. 2011). 
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As indicated earlier in this paper, there is no grand unifying theory of why and how distinct 
refugee groups migrate; only patterns observed over time and place. In 2009 ORR commissioned 
a report on secondary migration, but its findings were never released. The author of the report 
later noted that there was a “growing interest in learning more about what was happening related 
to secondary refugee migration, including how both refugees and receiving communities were 
faring when there were unexpected influxes of refugees” (Ott 2011). 
Attempted Fixes; Stalled Legislation  
Lawmakers have asked for improvements. Resettlement officials have asked for change. 
Refugees have told academics, who then published works that highlighted problems. Even ORR, 
in 2009, studied secondary migration specifically, but did not make the findings public. There is 
scant literature on the secondary migration of refugees in the U.S.; ORR is legally required to 
report figures to Congress annually, however there is negligible analysis. 
The need for scrutiny has not gone unnoticed. A bill introduced by Rep. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI-
9] in April 2011 maintains that “secondary migration is not properly tracked, and resources are 
not available for States and agencies experiencing high levels of secondary migration” 
(Rep. Peters 2011). In a bill introduced in June 2015, Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) proposed an 
assessment of the effectiveness of domestic resettlement programs and, high on the list of issues 
to be studied, "technological solutions for consistently tracking secondary migration" and more 
assessment of assistance to secondary refugee migrants, including: “the impact of secondary 
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migration on States hosting secondary migrants; the availability of social services for secondary 
migrants in those States; and unmet needs of those secondary migrants.”12 
Following the Money 
Secondary migration affects funding levels too; Arrival numbers for the past three years, paired 
with net migration for the same period, is used for the social services formula. 
All refugees arriving in the United States are entitled to eight months of Refugee Cash 
Assistance (RCA) from the date of their U.S. arrival. The amount varies based on the size of the 
family; families can also qualify for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) in lieu of 
RCA (Catholic Charities Refugee and Immigration Services of Maine n.d). 
Because of how federal funding is allocated on a per person basis to refugee resettlement 
agencies, when refugees then choose to move, those funds do not follow them to their secondary 
location; if refugee services are available in their target community, the agency may not have the 
resources to support the refugees, straining both the VOLAG involved, resulting in underserved 
refugee populations who may still be entitled to and require institutional support, and catching 
off-guard communities that were unprepared to handle an influx of new residents.  
Data obtained for this report from the Office of Refugee Resettlement for FY12-FY14 shows 
thousands of refugees move within the first three years. Anecdotally, however, refugees say it 
sometimes takes them a year or more to save the money to move on from the primary location, 
meaning secondary migration may in fact be much higher than currently reporting shows. 
                                                 
12 Sen. Stabenow, 2015; for a similar House bill narrower in scope, see: H.R.2839, “To reform and modernize 
domestic refugee resettlement programs, and for other purposes” 
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Targeted Assistance funds were distributed for the first time in FY83 “to offset the effects of 
spontaneous secondary migration of refugees by assistant areas where State, local and private 
resources have proved insufficient to meet the needs of refugees in the community” (Office of 
Refugee Resettlement 1983, p. 21). But according to some VOLAG and state officials, that 
funding is insufficient or arrives too late, despite decades of the same problem-solution 
combination. 
Kansas has withdrawn from the federal resettlement program, however in 2014, then-state 
refugee coordinator Lewis Kimsey described how the state was received two and even three 
times as many refugees over the primary resettled population. And because in some cases it was 
not their first move, recuperating the money to pay for the services provided was a challenge.  
The Somali in particular, they move a lot. We've got instances where they've 
moved five or six times before they've come to us, which is part of the challenge… 
the one piece that kind of lies below the surface, if you will, is ORR only moves 
the money for secondary migration once. So whichever state is lucky enough to 
identify that individual first, as long as they identify them at all within the two-
year window, are the ones that would see the social service money move. 
Kimsey also raises a point that no reports to Congress in recent years identified - trends in 
country of origin for migrating refugees. Understanding the demographics of refugee movement 
– including which nationalities or ethnicities are choosing to move more frequently, earlier, or 
farther – could provide answers to the effectiveness of current resettlement placements and 
create space for targeted programs to improve placement for future arrivals from the same group. 
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Swings and Misses 
The U.S. government did attempt, briefly, in the 1980s to understand and alter patterns of 
refugee migration. After extensive secondary movement by the Southeast Asian cohorts that 
arrived in the mid- to late-1970s and into the early 1980s, saturating most notably California with 
tens of thousands of new residents every year. First was the Khmer Guided Placement (KGP) 
project, during the second half of FY1981 and the first half of FY1982. In what officials labeled 
a "guided placement" pilot project, around 8,000 Cambodian refugees were resettled in 12 
clusters around the U.S. “The program did have some positive effects, as it achieved a reduction 
in the proportion of Cambodians resettled in California, from 35 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 
1981,” noted author Jacqueline Desbarats in a 1986 assessment of resettlement placement 
policies. “But it also had some unintended consequences. Thus, the city of Providence, Rhode 
Island, which was not a program participant, ended up with a Cambodian community twice as 
large as the largest cluster site” (Desbarats). According to an interview by the Christian Science 
Monitor with Kathy McCaughy, the refugee coordinator at the International Institute (then the 
leading resettlement agency in Providence), Cambodian communities filtered to Rhode Island 
from Boston and New York, where clusters had been established. “There's no reason to stay 
away from Providence,” she told the newspaper. “Rents are less than half” than in those two 
larger cities. 
 
The "Favorable Alternate Sites Project" followed two years later with the goal of reducing 
secondary migration “to the lowest possible level.”  FASP incentivized the local affiliates 
financially, rather than the refugees, to take in additional free-case refugees at two locations each 
in Arizona and North Carolina. Of the four sites, only one - Greensboro, North Carolina, saw 
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minimal secondary migration. The other three witnessed 27-52% out-migration. One take-away 
from an otherwise unrepeated pilot project was the benefit of "cluster" resettlement, which the 
authors called "the single most important element in the success of the FASP demonstration.” 
“Simply the decision to resettle free case refugees in distinct, ethnically-grouped clusters-over in 
a relatively short period of time… allows refugees to retain their cultural identity,” the authors 
wrote in a reporter commissioned by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. “It gives them at least 
a chance at developing the type of support within the community that is particularly needed since 
they do not have the support of anchor relatives” (Kogan and Vencill). 
Data and the Unknowns of Secondary Migration 
ORR publicly states that “appropriate placement and services from the onset is seen as a 
preventative measure against the challenges brought by secondary migration” (Office of Refugee 
Resettlement n.d.). But what isn’t known - or at least, hasn’t been made public, is who, how 
frequently, how soon - or long - after arrival, and why. Are refugees moving more frequently 
than their native-born neighbors? How long does it take them to find their most durable location 
home, and what is the financial cost of a delayed start in the U.S.? How can a continuity of 
services be provided? And how can agency and the right to freedom of movement be respected 
in a resettlement situation? To be clear, based on geographic mobility data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau for 2013-2014, 13.5% of native-born moved out of state that year, while 10% of foreign 
born do, whether naturalized or not (U.S. Census Bureau n.d.). Immigrants were more likely 
(12.5%) than their native-born counterparts (9.3%) to move for a new job or job transfer, 
according to U.S. Census Bureau data; among the foreign-born, non-citizens - like refugees in 
their first five years until they have qualified for citizenship, were twice as likely (9.9%) to 
change residences as their immigrant citizen counterparts (4.2%). 
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At this author’s request, ORR provided three years of aggregated secondary refugee migration 
data. The annual reports to Congress contain cursory summaries of secondary migration; the 
information found below was only available in such a format from FY12-FY14; additional 
written and telephone requests for disaggregated data and additional years were not fulfilled.  
The bias of this data is toward more recent refugees who have moved in the past three years, 
which is the portion of the refugee population of exclusive interest to ORR; therefore, the data 
provided yields only a portion of how many refugees moved into or out of the state within three 
years of arrival. It does not tally how many are residing in the state, how many are newly 
resettled, and what the net migration is on top of those two numbers. It also excludes granular 
data on motivations for movement. 
The data shows that there are 14 states that are consistent receivers of secondary migrants; 26 
that are consistent senders of secondary migrants; and nine that are variable. This is similar to the 
FY80 report to Congress in which 13 states had net inflow and 29 net outflow, although the most 
and least popular states for refugees have changed (California, Washington state and Virginia 
were the leading recipients 36 years ago; DC, Tennessee and New York saw the most out-
migration).  
Dividing the net migration rate in a fiscal year by the number of refugees and Cuban/Haitian 
entrants for that year establishes a rate of secondary migration for FY12-14 of 11-13%. When 
compared to a General Accounting Office report from 1986 based on data from two years earlier, 
it reveals nominal change over three decades: 14.4% of cases studied experienced secondary 
migration in 1984, according to the GAO (U.S. General Accounting Office 1986). 
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Sum of net migration 
FY12-14 
Minnesota 2,026 2,496 3,265 7,787 
Florida 444 603 746 1793 
Ohio 533 881 -238 1176 
Iowa 446 381 128 955 
Oklahoma 220 235 298 753 
Colorado 132 211 36 379 
Kansas 102 129 106 337 
Wisconsin 23 76 198 297 
Indiana 114 103 72 289 
Maine 98 102 67 267 
Nebraska 108 94 44 246 
South Dakota 178 6 25 209 
North Dakota 33 54 55 142 
Nevada 17 5 96 118 
Arkansas 43 -1 -4 38 
South Carolina 52 -40 20 32 
Vermont 13 8 10 31 
Delaware -2 4 7 9 
Washington -55 -44 98 -1 
Hawaii 0 -1 -1 -2 
West Virginia -1 -4 1 -4 
Mississippi -3 -7 -6 -16 
District of 
Columbia 
-5 -3 -9 -17 
Alaska -2 -7 -9 -18 
New Hampshire -26 -13 -5 -44 
Rhode Island -67 -56 -34 -157 
Oregon -111 -37 -63 -211 
Kentucky -127 -113 18 -222 
Alabama -69 -92 -83 -244 
Louisiana -141 -59 -57 -257 
Utah -88 -81 -122 -291 
Tennessee -182 -133 9 -306 
Illinois -77 -90 -144 -311 
New Jersey -88 -129 -122 -339 
Michigan -78 -88 -200 -366 
Maryland -96 -144 -148 -388 
New Mexico -135 -156 -131 -422 
Virginia -85 -164 -214 -463 
Missouri -167 -106 -220 -493 
Connecticut -137 -187 -196 -520 
Idaho -237 -176 -173 -586 
North Carolina -204 -278 -319 -801 
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Sum of net migration 
FY12-14 
Massachusetts -239 -306 -387 -932 
California -464 -379 -119 -962 
Pennsylvania -280 -311 -382 -973 
Georgia -215 -372 -417 -1004 
Texas -291 -636 -362 -1289 
New York -410 -517 -496 -1423 
Arizona -494 -653 -568 -1715 
Figure 5. Net Refugee Migration, FY12-14 (ranked by three-year sum)  
(Source: Office of Refugee Resettlement) 
 
A quick look reveals that some states, like Minnesota, are consistently pulling refugees in, while 
Arizona, New York and Texas are consistent in their refugee outflows. What is missing from the 
public data, however, is which nationalities are migrating, where and why. 
The ORR method isn't flawless; as described in their reports to Congress, secondary migration is 
established through a system in which VOLAGs report the Social Security numbers of refugee 
service recipients to ORR annually;13 but a 2000 memo from ORR Director Lavinia Limon 
specified to state and VOLAG officials that “states cannot require that applicants for ORR-
funded assistance and services provide social security numbers” (Limón 2000). 
Moreover, the arrival or departure of a few large families can skew outcomes in a number of 
states with low placement numbers. But over time, patterns emerge. When the three-year 
                                                 
13 (Hanh 2003): “The method of estimating secondary migration is based on the first three digits of social security 
numbers which the Social Security Administration assigns geographically in blocks by State. With the assistance of 
their sponsors, almost all arriving refugees apply for social security numbers immediately upon arrival in the U.S. 
Therefore, the first three digits of a refugee's SSN are a good indicator of his or her initial State of residence in the 
U.S. … The supporting documentation for secondary migrants must list all secondary migrants (including refugees, 
entrants, and Amerasians) who have resided in the U.S. for 36 months or less and who are residents of the State on 
September 30. The documentation may include persons drawn from State public assistance rolls, social service 
provider case files, Mutual Assistance Association (MAA) lists, and other organizations.”  
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migration average as a percentage of arrivals is paired with the net overall net migration for that 
period, we see that in some cases the flow is numerically high but statistically insignificant 
(Florida). This also allows us to see how secondary migration compares proportionally to the 
level of refugee arrivals to the state that year. For example, every year Minnesota hovers in the 
100-150% mark; it is receiving as many - and in some years more - refugees through secondary 
migration as it does through primary placement.  
Below, Columns 2-4 are the percentage of Secondary Refugee Migrants (Refugee and C/H 


















Arkansas 430.00% -14.29% -36.36% 126.45% 
Minnesota 116.44% 112.53% 146.28% 125.08% 
Oklahoma 70.97% 75.56% 72.68% 73.07% 
Iowa 102.76% 63.61% 18.47% 61.61% 
Delaware -40.00% 30.77% 175.00% 55.26% 
Maine 48.28% 29.06% 17.27% 31.53% 
Kansas 26.36% 27.22% 21.50% 25.02% 
Ohio 23.73% 31.24% -8.42% 15.52% 
South Dakota 27.55% 1.13% 4.73% 11.14% 
Wisconsin 2.90% 7.97% 17.28% 9.38% 
Nebraska 14.03% 9.33% 4.07% 9.14% 
North Dakota 5.95% 11.84% 9.45% 9.08% 
South Carolina 37.41% -25.97% 15.15% 8.86% 
Colorado 9.02% 11.68% 1.96% 7.55% 
Indiana 9.51% 6.68% 4.46% 6.88% 
Vermont 3.71% 2.48% 3.15% 3.12% 
Nevada 2.04% 0.39% 6.87% 3.10% 
Florida 2.60% 2.20% 2.55% 2.45% 
                                                 


















Washington -2.54% -1.80% 3.92% -0.14% 
Michigan -2.17% -1.89% -4.98% -3.01% 
Kentucky -6.96% -5.05% 0.69% -3.77% 
New Hampshire -7.16% -3.42% -1.45% -4.01% 
Illinois -3.66% -3.63% -5.50% -4.26% 
Texas -4.23% -6.95% -3.68% -4.96% 
Alaska -2.27% -6.54% -6.16% -4.99% 
California -8.94% -5.80% -1.90% -5.55% 
West Virginia -5.26% -16.00% 3.57% -5.90% 
Tennessee -14.39% -8.25% 0.58% -7.35% 
Oregon -13.25% -3.58% -5.28% -7.37% 
Utah -9.33% -6.79% -11.23% -9.12% 
Maryland -7.75% -11.58% -12.02% -10.45% 
Virginia -6.26% -11.01% -16.21% -11.16% 
North Carolina -9.52% -11.31% -12.68% -11.17% 
Pennsylvania -9.47% -11.70% -13.11% -11.43% 
New York -10.93% -12.45% -11.52% -11.64% 
Georgia -8.37% -13.47% -15.15% -12.33% 
Missouri -15.35% -8.02% -15.13% -12.83% 
Massachusetts -14.97% -16.24% -19.24% -16.82% 
Arizona -20.30% -19.97% -17.41% -19.23% 
Idaho -29.01% -19.09% -17.69% -21.93% 
Hawaii 0.00% -16.67% -50.00% -22.22% 
New Jersey -26.67% -21.75% -21.55% -23.33% 
District of Columbia -35.71% -25.00% -31.03% -30.58% 
Louisiana -61.30% -19.67% -19.00% -33.32% 
Connecticut -31.28% -34.12% -36.10% -33.83% 
Rhode Island -51.54% -32.75% -18.09% -34.12% 
New Mexico -46.55% -38.90% -50.58% -45.34% 
Alabama -44.23% -64.34% -64.84% -57.80% 
Mississippi -37.50% -100.00% -66.67% -68.06% 
Figure 6. Secondary Migration Patterns of Refugees, FY12-FY14.  
(Source: Office of Refugee Resettlement) 
 
It is an imperfect method; the ideal data would be how many recent or long-term refugee arrivals 
have moved, compared to the entire recent or long-term refugee population, a number which 
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would then be more comparable to foreign- and native-born internal migration patterns. 
Alternatively, tracking year-by-year cohort movements would also identify significant secondary 
migration patterns early on during an arrival period in which further groups from the same 
ethnicity or nationality are set to arrival; for example, continually assessing the movement of the 
recent Syrian refugee arrivals could establish patterns that would influence placement and 
integration efforts in the coming fiscal year.  
By then taking the top five most popular secondary migration inflow and outflow states in 
FY2014 identified in Figure 6, where popularity = (number of secondary migrants) / (total 
migrating refugee population), and pairing that with additional data for each state from the 
FY2014 ORR report to Congress, we see that there is no macro correlation in the first year for 








average = 47%) 
Wage 
(national  
average = $9.59) 
Health benefits 
(national average = 63%) 
Most popular states 61.8% $9.54 65.8% 
Minnesota 62% $9.69 27% 
Florida 38% $8.64 49% 
Oklahoma 77% $10.23 96% 
Wisconsin 57% $9.66 70% 
Iowa 75% $9.46 87% 
Arizona 57% $8.50 56% 
New York 71% $11.00 25% 
Georgia 35% $8.90 77% 
Massachusetts 74% $10.21 89% 
Pennsylvania 61% $9.29 78% 
Least popular states 59.6% $9.58 65% 
Figure 7. Employment, Wage and Health Benefits for Top In- and Out-Migration States for Refugees, FY2014  
(Source: Office of Refugee Resettlement) 
 
Furthermore, among the states most and least popular among migrating refugees in FY14, there 
is no clear marker among the governments measurable indicators for first-year success that 
distinguishes the best and worst performers; in fact, the average wage in the top five most 
attractive states ($9.54) is 4 cents less than that in the five least desirable states ($9.58). The 
average employment rate is less than 2 percentage points apart, and the number of refugees 
employed full time with health benefits is almost identical. This brief example shows that jobs 
and money do not alone drive refugee movement. Non-quantifiable factors, like family and 
friends, landscapes similar to a native country, and access to a line of work that is familiar, can 
be catalysts for geographic change as well. As Chapter 4 will address, dissatisfaction with 
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displacement and its offshoot, secondary migration, can be framed as both a problem, and a 
solution. 
Chapter 4: Secondary Migration as Problem and Solution: Towards Increased Agency in 
the Resettlement Process 
Anecdotally, refugees in Alabama, Florida, Maine and Tennessee have shared experiences of 
secondary migration with this author, sometimes four or five years after initial placement. Paired 
with appeals from refugee resettlement groups and government officials regarding the lack of 
resources to serve secondary refugee migrants, the 36-month survey period by ORR may not be 
sufficient to understand post-resettlement movement patterns. As Brown and Scribner of the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops note in a 2014 journal article, “Secondary 
migration can exacerbate the pressures that promote backlash against refugee communities and it 
can increase the strain on local social service networks and resettlement agencies” (Brown and 
Scribner 2014). And despite extensive internal migration by refugees, refugees still struggle and 
never quite catch up to their non-refugee immigrant counterparts after initial resettlement; “the 
occupational level and subsequent rate of pay of these jobs are not equal to those of other 
immigrants,” notes Phillip Connor in a 2010 study proving the existence of the so-called 
“refugee gap” (Connor 2010). Moreover, of the foreign-born populations that stem largely from 
refugee cohorts, and are anecdotally tied to secondary migration, like the Somali community 
described by Huisman (2011) and the Burmese community discussed in the Lugar report (2010), 
there are in some cases poverty rates two- to three- times as high as the native and non-refugee 
immigrant populations. For example, the most recent U.S. Census Bureau American Community 
Survey 1-year estimates average overall poverty rate in the U.S. is about 12%; for the foreign 
born overall, it rises to 17%. But for members of the key refugee countries, poverty rates 
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skyrocket: for the Burmese, it’s 28.9%; Iraqi: 39.4%; Sudanese: 40.7%; and Somali: 53.9%. The 
dispersion model implemented by USRAP “does not always work,” Connor asserts, “since 
refugees often migrate to neighborhoods with other co-ethnics… Combining greater access to 
affordable housing in advantaged neighborhoods along with the educational and English policy 
suggestions previously mentioned could result in a mitigation of the refugee gap” (Connor 2010). 
The Office of Refugee Resettlement admits: it tries to curb secondary migration, but it just does 
not know what the integration outcomes result from it.15 The agency says it is working to 
develop a data system “that can track initial placements, secondary migration, resettlement 
services rendered, and performance indicators” (Office of Refugee Resettlement n.d.). But the 
reality is that, at least according to a 2011 GAO report reveals secondary migration isn’t the only 
mystery to resettlement officials. “ORR’s four assistance programs showed some success in 
helping refugees obtain employment in fiscal year 2009,” the authors note, “but the percentage of 
program participants who obtained employment declined in recent years and little is known 
about which approaches are most effective in improving the economic status of refugees” (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2011). There is ample room to argue for improved data 
collection and analysis given these shortcomings.  
Refugees’ decision for secondary migration demonstrates strong self-determination in assessing 
the best environment for themselves and their families in which to thrive. This may be a step 
toward incorporation in their new home country, and has the effect of engendering “significant 
long term improvements in the overall health and well-being and employment prospects of 
                                                 
15 Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2016: “…(T)he disruption from moving on a refugees’ integration process is not 
fully known.” 
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resettled refugees,” demonstrating refugee agency in asserting freedom of movement (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2002). However, it also combines with anecdotes 
about families waiting years to move to be closer with members of their ethnic community, 
media reports from cities where waves of secondary refugee migrants arrived unexpectedly and 
strain local services, and government reports mentioning the issue only briefly, all of which 
highlight a flawed system that does not seem to take steps to improve placement outcomes.  
International Players 
UN agencies are regularly the first line in identifying refugees and processing their paperwork; 
UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration maintain field offices in the top 
refugee hubs, and make recommendations for best practices, including for resettlement. Though 
discussed at the abstract level in a handbook for resettlement, UNHCR, for example, 
acknowledges the benefit of improved refugee-community matching” and encourages placement 
processes that are “well coordinated so that the preferences of resettled refugees are observed 
wherever possible.” The question of the last clause, “wherever possible,” leaves the call for 
refugee choice open to interpretation on the part of more localized agencies. There are 
considerations like availability of affordable housing and jobs, and the resources of VOLAG 
affiliates in the U.S. cities where refugees are placed. But UNHCR goes further than the USRAP.  
“Resettled refugees who lived in a rural community in their country-of-origin may feel more 
comfortable if they are placed in a rural environment,” notes UNHCR in the resettlement 
handbook. “Where there is a large gap between the culture and prior life experience of resettled 
refugees and the receiving community, the presence of ethno-cultural community support will be 
particularly important.” The needs and wants of the Syrians, Burmese, Kurds and Somalis in 
placement may across ethnicities, socio-economic levels or education. In fact, UNHCR 
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highlights the importance of reunification with the greater community for Kurdish refugees, 
which is exemplified in the Nashville case discussed in Chapter 1. 
UNHCR also identifies the correlation between “inappropriate placement decisions” and 
secondary migration, and goes as far as linking those to “loss of community and official support 
for refugee resettlement in the primary site, in other communities and at governmental level.” 
This aligns with the example of the Burmese identified in the Lugar report - original matches that 
were insufficient consequently lead to animosity at the local level toward refugees and Burmese 
individuals. 
One problem area for the UN refugee agency is the level of inclusion in decision-making. The 
organization advises that refugees may not have the contextual knowledge to make an informed 
choice about their placement; “Nevertheless,” UNHCR notes, “involving resettled refugees in 
placement decisions can help them to re-establish control over their lives, reduce anxiety and 
prevent placement being perceived as something done to or for them…  due regard needs to be 
given to advance preparation and to ensuring that resettled refugees play an active role in 
placement decisions.” 
UNHCR also advocates for integration programs that adapt according to lessons learned and the 
variable needs of refugee populations; that feedback loop must also include refugees in 
developing, carrying out and assessing those changes. 
Integration 
The duty is on the U.S. government, then, to reconcile the right to freedom of movement, the 
logistics of resettlement, and the legal obligation to facilitate integration. The U.S. isn’t alone in 
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struggle to balance these elements. The UN Human Rights committee noted in a Nov. 15, 2000, 
periodic report on Denmark that asylum-seekers there "are often restricted or discouraged from 
choosing a residence in specific municipalities or from moving from one municipality to 
another." It advises the country to verify that those measures comply with article 12 of the 
ICCPR. (ICCPR Human Rights Committee 2000). Similarly, in Germany, asylees may “apply to 
the authorities to be allocated to a particular town or district, but such applications are only 
successful in highly exceptional cases,” e.g. if a rare medical condition requires that an asylum 
seeker has to stay close to a particular hospital, (AIDA: Asylum Information Database n.d.). 
Secondary migration shouldn't be strictly seen as a burden on the receiving community, or on the 
refugee. It is an exercise in agency; and can benefit the secondary location economically with an 
industrious workforce. As Matthew Hall discovered from an analysis of longitudinal data, 
“immigrants benefit, both in terms of employment and earnings, from making interstate moves” 
(Hall 2007). It can happen as individual or group decisions. The Hmong study already called for 
expanded understanding of refugee decision-making, advocating for resettlement officials to 
understand that lineage groups -- which extend beyond the nuclear family -- may desire and 
choose to live with or near each other. “However well-intentioned prospective migration-related 
policies may be,” the authors noted, “their chances of working effectively will be vastly 
increased if they are conceived and implemented with great respect for and consultation with 
Hmong desires and decision-making processes (Downing , Olney and Mason). 
The questions surrounding secondary migration aren’t the only ones to be resolved for improved 
integration outcomes. While “overhaul” is too strong, the current system demands changes - ones 
that would benefit refugees and their receiving communities. There are conflicting interests to 
balance. There is the refugees’ agency and right to freedom of movement. There is the need for 
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coordination between federal and local entities to resettle refugees. And there is the long-term 
interest of integration, which in theory benefits both the refugee and receiving community. 
Ethnic enclaves can stifle new language acquisition, holding back job progress and wages” 
(Beckhusen, et al. 2013). Explaining these choices to refugees, and understanding their 
motivations to move, are a starting point to facilitating integration. 
Conclusions 
The most recent data found herein hasn’t been analyzed or addressed in any academic literature; 
paired with a study of refugees in Canada, we can understand that secondary migration is not 
always a matter of following cheapest rent, or the best wages. There is something that is not 
being accounted for by the government when looking at refugee movement and integration. 
Secondary migration among refugees in the U.S. has occurred since the first years of the modern 
U.S. refugee resettlement program. But as this paper has shown, the government does not have a 
firm grasp on why it happens, what the patterns are, and how it affects integration - at least not in 
a way that they have publicly acknowledged; in doing so, they overlook an opportunity to 
encourage internal migration as a demonstration of agency, a tool for integration, and an exercise 
of human rights, rather than an encumbrance to the current program. The deficiency in the 
system has been sparsely documented, with no analysis of the numbers or trends; it's a chronic 
problem the U.S. government has failed to mitigate for 36 years, with secondary migration levels 
at nearly the same rate over three decades, to the detriment of refugees and the communities in 
which they live. The government acknowledges that secondary migration is not only a regular 
occurrence but often complicating factor in resettlement and integration efforts; yet it has not 
directly addressed the root causes nor publicly acknowledged the absolute number of refugees 
who move within the country after their arrival. 
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Furthermore, by making financial resources contingent on the initial location, there is a de facto 
limit on the right to freedom of movement. The suggestion to attached funds to the person, rather 
than the location, could alleviate much of the financial complications tied to secondary 
migration. International organizations and governments decide for refugees what country they 
will go to, and subsequently, where they will live in that country. This supplants personal and 
communal decision-making, creates a false dichotomy of choice, and jeopardizes freedom of 
movement - when placement plays a crucial part in refugee well-being and economic success, 
consequently integration efforts, and also sets the pattern for future group migration.  
One could argue that the U.S. resettlement program is working under the driving force of 
efficiency, without malicious intent to short-change refugees on services; a former ORR director 
said matching refugees to a location by work preference, for example, would be too complicated 
and time-consuming. And there is less resistance in accepting the status quo, in saying “here is 
better than there, and that should be good enough.” But does that uphold the legal obligation to 
facilitate integration, and uphold the freedom of movement? This paper has argued that the 
current system is not meeting those standards, and instead reinforces standard operation 
procedures of the international and national refugee systems. The country should instead move to 
dismantle the dispersion method and both retool the resources to be easily accessible by refugees 
anywhere, and allow greater refugee preference in the placement selection process. While 
politically, officials may favor a dispersion model to avoid the accusation of creating refugee 
enclaves, refugees ultimately are the decision-makers - accepting that need for community and 
social support and reframing it as a positive may go a long way to improving geographic stability 
and integration outcomes. The U.S. government should make secondary migration a priority 
issue and reframe the resettlement program through a more long-term approach to integration 
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that encourages choice in primary placement locations and also facilitates internal movement, 
rather than the current model which curtails agency, freedom of movement, and secondary 
migration. It could consider the following in moving toward more effective, rights-respecting 
and empowering resettlement through a two-pronged approach: improving data-gathering, and 
expanding refugee decision-making opportunities. 
Data-gathering  
Expand the Annual Survey of Refugees to capture more data 
 The current method for tracking secondary migration, which uses social security 
numbers, does not extend past 36 months from arrival. But ORR conducts an Annual 
Survey of Refugees in which granular data could be collected on movement; the five-
year, longitudinal-panel study on a sample of recent refugee households (who had lived 
in the U.S. between 8 months and 5 years)16 could at the very least extend the data-
gathering by two years to understand refugee movement in years 4 and 5.  
Determine causes and effects of secondary migration 
 Ask refugees and resettlement stakeholders what they are seeing and choosing, and why; 
identify potential problem areas, like states or resettlement agencies that are consistently 
                                                 
16 “For each member of refugee households that responded to the survey, the ASR collects basic demographic 
information such as age, country of origin, level of education, English language proficiency and training, job 
training, labor force participation, work experience, and barriers to employment. Other data are collected by family 
unit, including information on housing, income, and utilization of public benefits.” (Office of Refugee Resettlement 
n.d.)  
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seeing out-migration, or certain refugee cohorts that are moving earlier, faster, or farther 
than others.  
Decision-making 
Enable choice in primary placement 
 Provide information as early as possible on likely destinations for resettlement to allow 
refugees lead time on researching and establishing contacts with family and friends, to 
glean information from formal and informal networks. 
Reframe secondary migration as an opportunity to demonstrate agency and reclaim the right to 
freedom of movement 
 Working with UN agencies and VOLAGs, create a pilot program that expands refugee 
choice, while honoring the established affiliate network. Include data on schools and 
neighborhoods, rent costs, climate, religious facilities, mental health services, short- and 
long-term job opportunities, available benefits, public transportation, and training and 
classes available. By creating a market from which refugees can choose, they are again 
being allowed to take control of their lives and their futures. 
 Rather than recreating the FASP program from the 1980s, incentivize refugees instead of 
the agencies to move to certain areas with cost-of-living adjustments, or job-and-skill 
matching availability; open this up to be a group decision as well. This may also 
encourage certain religious and ethnic communities, for example, to take a bigger role in 
sponsoring new refugee arrivals; it could also lead to “benefits shopping” and subsequent 
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out-migration once the incentives run out, but by clustering refugees and appealing to 
their interests in work or climate 
Explore funding forward, not retroactively 
 A common complaint from resettlement agencies is the lag due to funding allocations 
being calibrated based on the previous three years of arrivals, not the anticipated arrivals 
for the coming year. Assessing secondary migration patterns will allow federal officials 
to anticipate pockets of arrivals and departures among certain refugee cohorts. 
Actively identify and support secondary migration patterns 
 At the first signs of secondary migration, brief community leaders and officials about the 
facts of refugee resettlement and what best practices are. Place temporary government or 
VOLAG coordinators in situ on short-term TDY to collaborate with secondary refugee 
migrants and service providers, and troubleshoot school, healthcare and training issues. 
 Create evaluation forms or checklists to review transition considerations with would-be 
movers; include reflective questions about available support systems, quality of life 
issues, and practical matters like housing and school proximity at the destination. 
 Provide information to refugees considering out-migration about destination choices and 
potential resources for resettlement benefits, healthcare, schools and jobs. 
48 
Bibliography 
AIDA: Asylum Information Database. "Freedom of Movement: Germany." n.d. AIDA: Asylum 
Information Database. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/reception-conditions/access-
forms-reception-conditions/freedom-movement>. 
Authorization for programs for domestic resettlement of and assistance to refugees. No. 8 U.S. 
Code § 1522. n.d. 
Beckhusen, Julia, et al. "Living and working in ethnic enclaves: English Language proficiency of 
immigrants in US metropolitan areas." Papers in Regional Science 92.2 (2013): 305–328. 
13 September 2016. 
Brown, Anastasia and Todd Scribner. "Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities: The Refugee 
Resettlement System in the United States." Journal on Migration and Human Security 
2.2 (2014): 101-120. 
Brown, Lawrence A., Tamar Mott and Edward J. Malecki. "Immigrant Profiles of U.S. Urban 
Areas and Agents of Resettlement." The Professional Geographer 59.1 (2007): 56-73. 
Capps, Randy, et al. "Integration Outcomes of U.S. Refugees: Successes and Challenges." 2015. 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-outcomes-us-refugees-successes-
and-challenges>. 
Case, Timothy Earl. "Secondary migration and economic adjustment of Vietnamese refugees in 
Michigan." Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1984. Dissertation. 
Catholic Charities Refugee and Immigration Services of Maine. "Refugees and Access to Funds 
& Benefits in the U.S." n.d. Catholic Charities Refugee and Immigration Services of 
Maine. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.ccmaine.org/docs/Refugee%20Immigration%20Services/159-
RefugeesandAccesstoFund.pdf>. 
"Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Denmark." ICCPR Human RIghts 
Committee, 2000. 
Connor, Phillip. "Explaining the Refugee Gap: Economic Outcomes of Refugees versus Other 
Immigrants." Journal of Refugee Studies 23.3 (2010). 
"Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees." 1951; 1967. 
<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>. 
Desbarats, Jacqueline. "Migration and Resettlement: Policy Influences on Refugee Resettlement 
Patterns." Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers (1986): 49-63. 
49 
Diamond, Jeremy. "Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim travel to U.S." 08 December 2015. CNN. 13 
September 2016. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-
immigration/>. 
Downing , Bruce T., et al. "The Hmong resettlement study." Site Report Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
Minnesota. University of Minnesota, 1984. 
Forrest, Tamar Mott and Lawrence A. Brown. "Organization-Led Migration, Individual Choice, 
and Refugee Resettlement in The U.S.: Seeking Regularities." Geographical Review 
January 2014: 10-32. 
Forrest, Tamar Mott. "Organization-led migration, individual choice, and refugee resettlement in 
the US: seeking regularities." Geographical Review 104.1 (2014): 10–32. 
"Freedom of Movement: Germany." n.d. AIDA: Asylum Information Database. 15 September 
2016. <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/reception-
conditions/access-forms-reception-conditions/freedom-movement >. 
Haines, David W. Case Studies in Diversity: Refugees in America in the 1990s. Westport: 
Praeger Publishers, 1997. 3. 
Hall, Matthew S. "Moving on and moving up: Interstate migration in the process of immigrant 
assimilation." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological 
Association. New York, 2007. 
Hanh, Nguyen Van. "Data Collection: ORR-11 (Refugee State-of-Origin Report)." 21 October 
2003. Office of Refugee Resettlement. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/state-letter-03-20>. 
Hein, Jeremy. Ethnic Origins: The Adaptation of Cambodian and Hmong Refugees in Four 
American Cities. Russell Sage Foundation, 2006. 
Huisman, Kimberly A. "Why Maine? Secondary migration decisions of Somali refugees." 
Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Migration 5 (2011): 55-98. 
Huisman, Kimberly A., et al., Somalis in Maine: Crossing Cultural Currents. North Atlantic 
Books, 2011. 
ICCPR Human Rights Committee. "Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
Denmark." ICCPR Human Rights Committee, 2000. 
Kogan, Deborah and Mary Vencill. An Evaluation of the Favorable Alternate Sites Project: 
Final Report. Washington: Office of Refugee Resettlement, 1984. 
Limón, Lavinia. "States cannot require that applicants for Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR)-funded assistance and services provide social security numbers." 16 November 
2000. Office of Refugee Resettlement. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/state-letter-00-23>. 
50 
"List of States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol." n.d. <http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html>. 
Lunn, Laura P. ""Displaced and Disillusioned: "Free-Case" Refugees and the government's 
obligation to facilitate effective resettlement." The Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice 
(2011). 
Macchi, Victoria. "Born to play: A refugee soccer team grows in the American desert." February 
2016. Voice of America. <http://projects.voanews.com/all-over-the-map/refugee-
american-soccer/>. 
—. "Half a World Away, Vietnamese Build Lives on the American Bayou." December 2015. 
Voice of America. 15 September 2016. <http://projects.voanews.com/all-over-the-
map/vietnamese-bayou/>. 
—. "The Young Kurds: A Generation of Refugees Comes of Political Age in the American 
South." Forthcoming. Voice of America. <www.voanews.com>. 
Martin, David A. The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New Era of 
Refugee Resettlement. Migration Policy Institute, 2005. 
Moritz, Frederic A. "‘California dream' beckons Asian refugees to resettle." 28 July 1983. 
Christian Science Monitor. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0728/072850.html>. 
Mott, Tamar. African Refugee Resettlement in the United States. El Paso: LFB Scholarly 
Publishing, 2009. 
Muth, Mark. "Refuge in Providence; Cambodians Find A New Life In Rhode Island." Christian 
Science Monitor 25 March 1982. 
Newbold, Bruce. "Secondary migration of immigrants to Canada: an analysis of LSIC wave 1 
data." Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe canadien 51.1 (2007): 58-71. 
Nezer, Melanie. "Resettlement at Risk: Meeting Emerging Challenges to Refugee Resettlement 
in Local Communities." 2013. 
Nibbs, Faith. "Belonging: The Resettlement Experiences of Hmong Refugees in Texas and 
Germany." Belonging: The Social Dynamics of Fitting in as Experienced by Hmong 
Refugees in Germany and Texas. Carolina Academic Press, 2014. 31 01 2016. 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/belonging-resettlement-experiences-hmong-
refugees-texas-and-germany>. 
Office of Refugee Resettlement. Annual Report to Congress, FY1981. Washington: U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1982. 









—. Annual Report to Congress, FY2013. Washington: U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, n.d. 




—. "Annual Reports to Congress." n.d. Office of Refugee Resettlement. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/annual-orr-reports-to-congress>. 
—. Statistical Abstract for Refugee Resettlement Stakeholders. Washington: U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2016. 
—. "What We Do." n.d. Office of Refugee Resettlement. 17 September 2016. 
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/what-we-do>. 
Ott, Eleanor. Get Up and Go: Refugee Resettlement and Secondary Migration in the USA. 
Research Paper #219. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Geneva, 2011. 
Pho, Tuyet-Lan, Jeffrey N. Gerson and Sylvia R. Cowan, Southeast Asian refugees and 
immigrants in the mill city : changing families, communities, institutions - thirty years 
afterward. Burlington: University of Vermont Press, 2007. 
Rapoport, Hillel and Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga. Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas: a 
Policy Proposal to Reform the EU Asylum Policy. European University Institute. Italy: 
European University Institute, 2014. 
Rathod, Sara. "The Freak-Out Over Syrian Refugees Is Continuing in These States." 26 February 
2016. Mother Jones. 13 September 2016. 
<http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/02/anti-Syrian-refugee-legislation-states>. 
"Refugee Admissions." n.d. U.S. State Department. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/>. 
Rep. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI-9]. "H.R.1475 - Domestic Refugee Resettlement Reform and 
Modernization Act of 2011 ." House Bill. Washington, 12 April 2011. 
Richard, Anne C. "Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration." Media 
Briefing: Global Refugee and Migration Crises. New York, 29 September 2015. 
52 
"Secondary Migration of Refugees: Collaborating to Ensure Community Integration." 23 
September 2014. Transcript, Office of Refugee Resettlement Webinar. 
Seipel, Arnie. "30 Governors Call For Halt To U.S. Resettlement Of Syrian Refugees." 17 
November 2015. NPR. 13 September 2016. 
<http://www.npr.org/2015/11/17/456336432/more-governors-oppose-u-s-resettlement-
of-syrian-refugees>. 
Sen. Stabenow, Debbie [D-MI]. "S.1615 - Domestic Refugee Resettlement Reform and 
Modernization Act of 2015 ." Washington, 18 June 2015. Senate Bill. 
Service, Congressional Research. Review of U.S. refugee resettlement programs and policies: a 
report . Committee on the Judiciary. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 1980. 
Shaw, Stacey and Patrick Poulin. "Findings from an Extended Case Management U.S. Refugee 
Resettlement Program." International Migration and Integration (2014): 1099-1120. 
Simich, Laura and Lisa Andermann, Refuge and Resilience [electronic resource] : Promoting 
Resilience and Mental Health among Resettled Refugees and Forced Migrants. Springer, 
2014. 
Simich, Laura, Morton Beiser and Farah N. Mawani. "Social Support and the Significance of 
Shared Experience in Refugee Migration and Resettlement." Western Journal of Nursing 
Research 25.7 (2003): 872-891. 
Singer, Audrey and Jill H. Wilson. From 'There' to 'Here': Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan 
America. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2006. 
Suárez-Orozco, Carola and Marcelo Suárez-Orozco. Transformations: Immigration, Family Life, 
and Achievement Motivation Among Latino Adolescents. Stanford University Press, 1995. 
"The International Thesaurus of Refugee Terminology." n.d. United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees. 17 September 2016. 
<http://www.refugeethesaurus.org/hms/home.php?publiclogin=1>. 
"The Refugee Act." n.d. Office of Refugee Resettlement. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/the-refugee-act>. 
"The Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on the security of the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program." Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth 
Congress, first session. U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2016. 
"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights." n.d. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>. 
Tsolidis, Georgina. Migration, diaspora and identity : cross-national experiences. New York: 
Springer, 2014. 
53 
U.S. Census Bureau. "Geographical Mobility: 2013 to 2014." n.d. 15 September 2016. 
<http://www.census.gov/data/tables/2014/demo/geographic-mobility/cps-2014.html>. 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. "The United States Refugee Admissions Program 
Consultation & Worldwide Processing Priorities." n.d. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services. 15 September 2016. <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
asylum/refugees/united-states-refugee-admissions-program-usrap-consultation-
worldwide-processing-priorities>. 
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. How do refugees come to America? . n.d. 16 
September 2016. <http://refugees.org/explore-the-issues/our-work-with-
refugees/refugeeresettlementprocess/>. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of 
Refugee Resettlement. "Report to the Congress: Refugee Resettlement Program." 1983. 
U.S. Department of State. "Cumulative Summary of Refugee Admissions." 31 December 2015. 
13 September 2016. <http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/251288.htm>. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Refugee Program: Initial Reception and Placement of New 
Arrivals Should Be Improved. Report to the Chairmen, Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate and Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. 
Washington, 1986. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Refugee Assistance: Little Is Known about the 
Effectiveness of Different Approaches for Improving Refugees’ Employment Outcomes . 
Report to Congressional Committees. Washington, 2011. 
—. "Refugee Resettlement: Greater Consultation with Community Stakeholders Could 
Strengthen Program." 2012. <http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf>. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, Progress Report on Resettlement." 2014. 
<http://www.unhcr.org/53aa90bf9.html>. 
—. "Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015." n.d. 13 September 2016. <unhcr.org/en-
us/576408cd7.pdf>. 
—. "Information on Refugee Resettlement." Brochure. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, n.d. 
—. "Pathways to Welcoming and Rebuilding: A Handbook to Guide Reception and Integration 
of Resettled Refugees." 2002. 
—. Resettlement. n.d. <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html >. 
—. "Resettlement Handbook." 2011. <http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.html>. 
54 
—. "The Integration of Resettled Refugees: Essentials for Establishing a Resettlement 
Programme and Fundamentals for Sustainable Resettlement Programmes." 2013. 
<http://www.unhcr.org/52a6d85b6.html>. 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. "Syria's refugee crisis and its 
implications." July 2013. 3 May 2016. 
<http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo39835/Syria%20Factsheet%20-
%20July%2018(2).pdf>. 
United States Senate. Abandoned upon arrival: implications for refugees and local communities 
burdened by a U.S. resettlement system that is not working: a report to the members of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations. 111th Congress, Second Session. Washington: U.S. 
G.P.O, 2010. <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT57483/pdf/CPRT-
111SPRT57483.pdf >. 
Weine, Stevan Merrill , et al. "Secondary Migration and Relocation Among African Refugee 
Families in the United States." Family Process 50.1 (2011): 27-46. 
Zong, Jie and Jeanne Batalova. Refugees and Asylees in the United States. Migration Policy 
Institute, 28 October 2015. 1 January 2016. 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-asylees-united-states>. 
 
